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RECENT TREND IN COURT DECISIONS IN CALIFORNIA*
By

JUSTICE JESSE W. CARTERI

Ninety-six years ago Justice Stephen J. Field, then a member of the
Supreme Court of California, in his dissenting opinion in Ex parte Newman,1 said:
"The law is a science, whose leading principles are settled. They are not
to be opened for discussion upon the elevation to the bench of every new
Judge, however subtle his intellect, or profound his learning, or logical his
reasoning. Upon their stability men rest their property, make their contracts,
assert their rights, and claim protection. It is true that the law is founded
upon reason, but by this is meant that it is the result of the general intelligence, learning, and experience of mankind, through a long succession of
years, and not of the individual reasoning of one or of several judges. . . .

It is possible that some intellects may rise to the perception of absolute
truth, and be justified in questioning the general judgment of the learned of
mankind. But before the legitimate and just inference arising from the
general acquiescence of the learned can be avoided, the error in the principles recognized should be clearly shown. We should not blindly adhere to
precedents, nor should we more blindly abandon them as guides." 2
The thought expressed by Justice Field in the foregoing excerpt was
epitomized by Lord Hardwicke nearly 200 years ago in these words: "Certainty is the mother of repose; therefore, the law aims at certainty."
If these concepts were dominant in the formation of court decisions
there would obviously be more unanimity and less conflicts, and there would
be no occasion to talk about trends in court decisions. But judges are human
beings and their thinking is influenced by their backgrounds of education,
training and associations, past and present. It cannot be denied that these
are times of conflicting social, economic and political philosophies, and the
impact of these philosophies is felt not only by the executive and legislative
branches of our government but by the judicial branch as well. We quite
often hear the words "liberal," "conservative," "reactionary," "middle-ofthe-road," "left," "right." These terms are all as equally applicable to judges
as they are to those in the executive and legislative branches of our government. Who answers a particular designation may be the subject of some conflict but there seems to be pretty general agreement in their application.
Holmes was said to be a liberal in civil rights cases and in cases involving
the right of the people through their legislatures to experiment in attempting
to solve social and economic ills, and many of his greatest dissents were in
these fields, while in some other fields he was considered a conservative.
*Address delivered before the Lawyers' Club of San Francisco on February 10, 1954.
tAssociate Justice of the Supreme Court of California. LL.B Golden Gate College; Member of
the American Bar Association; Member of the American Law Institute.
19 Cal. 502 (1858).
'Id. at 526.
(133)
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Students of history recognize that the trend of court decisions is influenced by the point of view of the majority on the major issues of the times.
The number and character of the dissents depend upon the ability, convictions and industry of the minority. In some of my dissents, I have referred
to the trend of decision of the Supreme Court of California during the last
few years.
To my mind this trend has been decidedly reactionary. This statement
is made advisedly and is based upon numerous recent decisions rendered by a
majority of the Supreme Court of California in which the court has, by a
non-liberal construction of the Constitution and laws of this state, denied
litigants rights to which they were entitled.
To be more specific, the Supreme Court of California has by a series
of decisions during the past two or three years stricken down the remedial
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act designed to protect employees
who suffer industrial injuries as a result of the serious and wilful misconduct
of their employers. I recently stated in one of my dissents in these cases that
by its recent decisions in this field the Supreme Court of California had wiped
out forty years of progress in nullifying, by interpretation, a statute which
was designed to bring social justice to the working men and women of this
state. I am one of those who can remember the plight of the injured workman
before the Workmen's Compensation Act was adopted. It is now a matter of
history that the adoption of the Act by the Legislature of California was bitterly fought by employer groups, and after its adoption it ran the gamut of
adverse court decisions for many years. It might be of interest at this point
to quote from the biennial message of Governor Hiram W. Johnson to the
Legislature of California in 1917 in which he reviewed the incidents leading
up to the adoption and early period of the operation of this Act. He said:
"The new philosophy of government, which has obtained in California
had its best and most sharply defined demonstration in the workmen's compensation law. In 1911, we stood at the threshold of a great unexplored governmental field. Behind us were the humiliation and shame of thirty years of
exploited government, cynically administered for a few. With hope in democracy renewed by the first experience with the direct primary, with undefined,
yet certain knowledge of democracy's obligations, we turned from the old
sordid materialism, and looked to the greater promise of activity for humanity itself. We entered falteringly the unexplored field, and then our steps
grew firm and our vision broad, and today no commonwealth has gone
farther or built better for humanity.
"Those who believed that industry should bear the burden of its accidents, that its maimed and its injured should not be cast forever upon the
scrap heap of humanity, were tirelessly seeking a legal remedy. It was realized that the frightful burden of accident should not be wholly upon him
least able to bear it, but the path to relief through the intricate mazes of the
law was difficult to find. The legislature of 1911 adopted an elective law
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which, though not wholly effective, afforded opportunity for an educational
propaganda and a thorough investigation.
"The first Industrial Accident Commission, consisting of A. J. Pillsbury,
Will J. French and Willis I. Morrison, prepared'an elaborate workmen's compensation law which was presented to the legislature in 1913, was duly adopted, and became operative January 1, 1914. While this law was pending and
before it had undergone the actual test of administration, it was the center
of perhaps the bitterest contest that has been waged over any enactment of
recent years. And out of all the bitterness and abuse and denunciation of
that contest which may come to you who are now assuming legislative duties,
is the lesson that must ever be learned by him who would fearlessly represent
those who have entrusted him with power. Every day, during the session of
1913, all those newspapers of the State of California which have ever been
opposed to any sort of social justice, published page after page, not alone of
so-called conservative argument against the 'corroding socialism' of the state
government, but of the foulest abuse of every individual advocating the law.
To public scorn and ridicule and contumely we were held up as 'destroyers
of industry,' 'looters of business,' traitors to the state,' 'arrant demagogues
pandering to the worst elements of our citizenship.' . . . The law never-

theless passed. Six months after it had been operating, we had the satisfaction
of listening to the leaders of labor and the representatives of the largest
employers in the State of California, united in a public gathering in universal
praise of the act. Today, employer and the employee alike join in commendation. .

.

. No man in public life would have the temerity to suggest the

repeal of the Workmen's Compensation Law, and this law has been the vindication and the justification of California's social program.
"In order to preclude the possibility of adverse decisions by the courts,
certain provisions of the law will probably have to be re-enacted, and the
amendments in this regard will be presented to you by the commission."a
While I think I am safe in saying that no one in public life today would
advocate the repeal of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the tendency
of the Legislature has been to extend and liberalize its provisions, some of the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of California4 have had the effect of
destroying or drastically curtailing the benefits which the provisions of the

Act were designed to confer upon the injured employees. This has been true
notwithstanding the express mandatory provisions of the Act imposing upon
the courts the duty of liberal construction to the end that the benefits sought

to be conferred on injured employees will be obtained by them.
'1917 Senate Journal 14 at 19, et seq.
'Hawvaiian Pineapple Co. v. Ind. Ace. Com, 40 Cal2d 656, 255 P.2d 431 (1953) ; Mercer-Fraser
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 40 Cal.2d 102, 251 P.2d 955 (1953) ; Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Ind.
Ace. Corn., 40 Cal.2d 139, 251 P.2d 975 (1953) ; Cal.-Western etc. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Corn., 39
Cal.2d 104, 244 P.2d 912 (1952) ; Fireman's Fund etc. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 39 Cal.2d 529, 247
P.2d 707 (1952) ; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 39 Cal2d. 512, 247 P.2d 697 (1952) ;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Corn., 38 Cal.2d 599, 241 P.2d 530 (1952) ; California-Western
States Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Corn., 38 Cal.2d 880, 242 P.2d 13 (1952) ; Bryant v. Industrial Acc.
Corn., 37 Cal.2d 215, 231 P.2d 33 (1951) ; Cal. Shipbuilding Corp. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 31 Cal.2d
278, 188 P.2d 32 (1947) ; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Ace. Con., 30 Cal.2d 388, 182 P.2d 159
(1947) ; Pacific Freight Lines v. Ind.Acc.Com., 26 CaL2d 234, 157 P.2d 634 (1945) ; Garcia v. Industrial Accident Corn., 40 A.C. 705, 263 P.2d 8 (1953).
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Another field in which the trend of decision by the Supreme Court of
California in recent years has been ultra-conservative is in negligence cases
where the court has, in numerous cases, deprived the parties of the right of
trial by jury by holding, as a matter of law, that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain a verdict reached by the jury. This conclusion has been reached in
many cases where the verdict of the jury was approved by the trial judge in
denying a motion for a new trial, affirmed by unanimous decision of a district court of appeal and decided by the Supreme Court by a division of its
members. It has been my position in each of these cases that when an issue
of fact is submitted to a jury, its decision thereon, in the absence of prejudicial error in the admission or rejection of evidence or erroneous instructions to the jury, should be final. I can see no escape from this rule if the
constitutional provision that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate" is to be upheld.
Until the last few years the traditional rule in this state was that only
in cases where the uncontradicted evidence was such that reasonable minds
could not differ that the issues of negligence and contributory negligence
might be decided as issues of law. In many recent cases,5 the Supreme Court
of California has ignored this rule by the simple process of arbitrarily disregarding the determination of the trier of fact and holding, as a matter of
law, that the evidence supporting such determination was insufficient. In one
recent case,' however, the majority cited the cases which established the
reasonable minds rule and then misstated the rule and refused to apply the
correct rule to the case. In that case the majority stated:
"Whether or not defendant was guilty of negligence or plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of mixed fact and
law and may be determined as a matter of law only if reasonablemen follow.
ing the law can draw but one conclusion from the evidence presented."'
(Emphasis added.)
In that case, the majority reversed a unanimous jury verdict approved
by the trial court on a motion for a new trial and affirmed by a unanimous
decision of the District Court of Appeal. This reversal was based on the sole
ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. The undeniable
5

Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 290, 246 P.2d 663 (1953); Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Ind.
Acc. Com., 40 Cal.2d 656, 255 P.2d 431 (1953) ; Better Food Mkts. v. Amer. Dist. Teleg. Co., 40
Cal.2d 179, 253 P.2d 10 (1953) ; Atkinson v. Pacific Fire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal.2d 192, 253 P.2d
18 (1953); Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 139, 251 P.2d 975 (1953) ; MercerFraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 40 Cal.2d 102, 251 P.2d 955 (1953) : Gill v. Hearst Publishing
Co., 40 Cal.2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953) ; Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal.2d 254, 253 P.2d 447 (1953) ;
Pirkle v. Oakdale Union etc. School Dist., 40 Cal.2d 207, 253 P.2d 1 (1953) ; Burtis v. Universal
Pictures Co., Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823, 256 P.2d 933 (1953) ; Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
40 Cal.2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953) ; Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953) ;
Turner v. Mellon, 41 A.C. 44, 257 P.2d 15 (1953) ; Barrett v. City of Claremont, 41 A.C. 69, 256
P.2d 977 (1953) ; Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571, 241 P.2d 990 (1952).
'Gray v. Brinkerhoff, 41 A.C. 183, 258 P.2d 834 (1953).
7Id. at 187, 258 P.2d at 836.
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implication of this decision is that the twelve jurors, the trial judge and the
three members of the district court, as well as I, who did not agree with the
majority, could not be classified as "reasonable men following the law." In
other words, the view of the majority was that they themselves were the only
"reasonable men following the law" who had participated in that case. In
this case I might add that the verdict was in favor of the defendant.
I was engaged in the active practice of law for over twenty-six years
before I became a member of the Supreme Court of California. I participated
in the trial of over a thousand cases; over three hundred of these cases
reached the appellate or Supreme Court on appeal and in none of these cases
was a decision of the appellate or Supreme Court based on the insufficiency
of the evidence to support the decision of the trial court or jury. In those days
lawyers felt, and had a right to feel, that when issues of fact were determined
by the trial court, or jury, and the case was appealed, the factual determination by the trier of fact would be accepted by the appellate court. While
there may have been cases in those days in which this rule was violated by
the Supreme Court, or a District Court of Appeal, they were few and far between. Now the exception has become the rule as I have in mind no less than
fifteen cases in which the Supreme Court has decided the factual issues contrary to the trial court or jury in the last two years. It goes without saying
that I dissented in each of these cases.
If there is any proposition that should be settled in this state it should
be the oft-repeated rule that it is the function of an appellate court, in reviewing the evidence, to resolve all conflicts in favor of the respondent and
that all legitimate and reasonable inferences must be indulged to uphold
the verdict and that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported by the
evidence, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted, or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. I
maintain that this rule has been ruthlessly violated by a majority of the
Supreme Court of California in many recent decisions. In my opinion this
trend of decision not only does not advance the science of jurisprudence or
aid in the administration of justice but is a serious impediment to each of
these objectives. Aside from the inability of an appellate court to determine
from the cold record the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence,
it has the effect of placing an undue burden on the members of the Supreme
Court whose sole duty is to decide questions of law based upon the factual
determination of the trier of fact.
In the book, Trial Judge, by Justice Bernard Botein,8 the author states:
"A major reason for a trial judge's concern about his decisions in
nonjury proceedings is that an appellate court will rarely disturb his deter'Simon & Schuster (1952).
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mination of the facts. This stamps the trial judge's finding with a disturbing finality.
"The finding of the facts, which entails the acceptance of the sound, and
the rejection of the unsound, evidence, and the final packaging of the remaining ingredients at the end of the trial court production line, are almost exclusively the function of the trial judge or jury. The package may be labeled
judgment for plaintiff or defendant.
"Seldom may an appellate court change or reject such findings. It may
decide that on the facts as found in the trial court, the law was misapplied
or misunderstood, so that the verdict or decision went in favor of the wrong
party. In that event they may say, 'We've looked into the package and think
you've put the wrong label on it. We won't disturb the contents of your package, but we're going to change the label so that it will read in favor of the
other party.'
"The appellate court may also decide that the trial judge admitted
improper evidence or excluded proper evidence, or that he instructed the
jury erroneously. Then it may reverse the verdict or decision, and send the
case back to be tried anew. It then says in effect to the trial court, 'We have
examined the ingredients of your package, and find that it contains certain
harmful substances.' Or, 'We find that you left out certain ingredients which,
in the public interest, we feel should have been included to ensure the purity
of your product. We are therefore returning your package, and directing
that you process it once more, in accordance with the formula we are now
giving you'." 9
Another respect in which recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
California have retarded the administration of justice is by curtailing the
power of a trial judge in granting a motion for a new trial on limited issues.
For many years section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure has provided
that the trial court may grant a motion for a new trial on part of the issues
only. Up until about a year and a half ago most of the appellate court decisions held that under this section a trial judge had the power to grant a
motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only in a personal injury
action where the damages awarded were either excessive or inadequate and
that his ruling would not be disturbed in the absence of a gross, manifest
and unmistakable abuse of discretion.'" The same rule was applied to such
an order as to an order granting a new trial on the insufficiency of the evidence. But in August of 1952 the Supreme Court of California held that it
"Id. at 131.
"Hicks v. Ocean Shore Railroad, Inc., 18 Cal.2d 773, 117 P.2d 850, (1941) ; Estate of Everts,
163 Cal. 449, 125 Pac. 1059, (1912); Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal.App.2d 217, 148 P.2d 680 (1944);
People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. McCullough, 100 Cal.App.2d 101, 223 P.2d 37 (1950)
Ona v. Reachi, 105 Cal.App.2d 758, 233 P.2d 949 (1951) ; County of Los Angeles v. Bitter, 103
Cal.App.2d 385, 229 P.2d 466 (1951) ; Perry v. Fowler, 102 Cal.App.2d 808, 229 P.2d 46 (1951) ;
Parks v. Dexter, 100 Cal.App.2d 521, 224 P.2d 121 (1950) ; J. Levin Co. v. Sherwood & Sherwood,
55 Cal.App. 308, 203 Pac. 404 (1921); Rigall v. Lewis, 1 Cal.App.2d 737, 37 P.2d 97 (1934);
Spencer v. Nelson, 84 Cal.App.2d 61, 190 P.2d 40 (1948) ; Wold v. League of the Cross, 107 Cal.
App. 344, 290 Pac. 460 (1930) ; Amore v. Di Resta, 125 Cal.App. 410, 13 P.2d 986 (1932) ; John-
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was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant a new trial in a personal
injury action on the issue of damages only where the damages awarded by a
jury were inadequate. 1 This holding was made in four personal injury cases
where the evidence both as to liability and damages was conflicting. The
theory of the majority opinions in these cases seemed to be that the jury
compromised the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff with the understanding that a small amount of damages would be awarded, and that it was
therefore unjust to the defendant for the case to be retried on the issue of
damages only. In one of these cases the court squarely held that the issues of
liability and damages were so interwoven that a just conclusion could not be
reached with respect to the issue of damages without retrying the issue of
liability. This holding was clearly contrary to the holding of this same
Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Tucker,"2 decided in 1947, where it was held
that the issues of liability and damages in personal injury actions were entirely separate and distinct and that where liability is admitted by the defendant it is error to allow evidence of liability over defendant's objection.
There can be no question but that the effect of the holding of the Supreme Court in'the Leipert, Rose, Cary, and-Hamasaki cases is to deprive
the trial court of power to grant a new trial in a personal injury action on
the issue of damages only, where the damages awarded by the jury are obviously inadequate, and to require a re-trial on all of the issues even though
it is obvious to the trial court and to everyone connected with the case that
there is little or no doubt as to the liability of the defendant. Thus, so far
as this type of case is concerned, the salutary provision authorizing the
granting of a new trial on a part of the issues only is a nullity. It is obvious
that by this provision the Legislature sought to make it possible to facilitate
the disposition of cases of this character andthus save the time of the court
and the expense and burden to litigants which necessarily results from protracted trials. Certainly the trial judge who sees the witnesses, hears the testimony and observes its effect upon the jury is in a better position to say
whether the amount of the verdict was affected by the evidence as to liability
than an appellate court which has only the printed record before it. I therestone v. Johnson, 38 CaLApp.2d 700, 102 P.2d 374 (1940) ; Adams v. Hildebrand, 51 Cal.App.2d
117, 124 P.2d 80 (1942) ; Crandall v. McGrath, 51 Cal.App.2d 438, 124 P.2d 858 (1942) ; Bauman
v. San Francisco, 42 Cal.App.2d 144, 108 P.2d 989 (1940); Pacific TeL & Tel. Co. v. Wellman, 98
Cal.App.2d 151, 219 P.2d 506 (1950) ; Tumelty v. Peerless Stages, 96 Cal.App. 530, 274 Pac. 430
(1929) ; Cox v. Tyrone Power Enterprises Inc., 49 Cal.App.2d 383, 121 P.2d 829 (1942) ; McNear
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 63 Cal.App.2d 11, 146 P.2d 34 (1944) ; Henslee v. Fox, 25 Cal.App.2d
286, 77 P.2d 307 (1938) ; Zeller v. Reid, 26 Cal.App.2d 421, 79 P.2d 449 (1938) ; Martin v. Donohue,
30 Cal.App.2d 219, 85 P.2d 913 (1938) ; Ohran v. Yolo County, 40 CalApp.2d 298, 104 P.2d 700
(1940) ; Tornell v. Munson, 80 CaLApp.2d 123, 181 P.2d 112 (1947) ; Woods v. Eitze, 94 Cal.App.2d
910, 212 P.2d 12 (1949) ; Tripcevich v. Compton, 25 CaLApp.2d 188, 77 P.2d 286 (1938).
"Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal.2d 462, 247 P.2d 324 (1952) ; Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal2d 481,
247 P.2d 335 (1952) ; Cary v. Wentzel, 39 Cal.2d 491, 247 P.2d 341 (1952) ; Hamasake v. Flotho,
39 CaL2d 602, 248 P.2d 910 (1952).
"31 CaL2d 1, 187 P.2d 782 (1947).
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fore say that the obvious effect of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
of California in this field is to retard and obstruct the administration of
justice.
A few years ago the Supreme Court of California held that a married
woman was barred from recovering for her personal injuries by the contributory negligence of her husband because the recovery would be community
property under the law of California and her husband would thereby profit
from the result of his own wrong. 8 In that case I dissented and the Legislature, at the following session, attempted to overcome the effect of the majority
decision.' 4 This amendment has not been interpreted by the Supreme Court,
but the case of Zaragosav. Craven has been widely criticized by text writers
and courts of other states. In 1952, a case involving this question came before
the Supreme Court of New Mexico.' After referring to the Zaragosa case,
the Supreme Court of New Mexico refused to follow it and concluded its
opinion saying:
"We are of the opinion that reason, justice and a fair interpretation of
our community statute, construed either in the light of the common or Spanish law, require that we hold the cause of action for the personal injury to
the wife, and for the resultant pain and suffering, belongs to the wife, and
that the judgment and its proceeds are her separate property. She brought
her body to the marriage and on its dissolution is entitled to take it away;
she is similarly entitled to compensation from one who has wrongfully violated her right to personal security. If any writer has ever said a kind word
for the majority holding [in the Zaragosa case], it has escaped our notice.
"Under the majority doctrine, if the wife were riding a horse she had
brought to the marriage and some driver of a motor vehicle negligently struck
her and the horse, throwing both into a wire fence, breaking the leg of each
and also disfiguring them, the cause of action for the damage to the horse
would belong to the wife, but that for the injury to her would belong to the
community and the husband would receive one half of the proceeds of a
judgment. In addition, the husband could, if he desired, refuse to bring suit
for the injuries 6the wife had sustained. We decline to adopt such a rule in
New Mexico.'
It seemed to me at the time the Zaragosa case was decided, and I am
still of the same view, that the majority opinion in that case deprived the
wife of a right to which she was entitled under any reasonable interpretation
of the law or consideration of justice and I am pleased to know that this view
has been accepted in some of the other jurisdictions where community property law prevails.
In civil rights cases, the Supreme Court of California has nullified the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and section 19
of article I of the Constitution of California by holding that evidence ob"Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 CaL2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949).
"CALIF. CIv. CODE § 171 c. (Deering, 1953).
5
Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952).
'1ld. at 494, 245 P.2d at 832, 833.
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tained in violation of these provisions is competent and admissible in the
courts of this state. The effect of this holding is to abrogate the right of
privacy in California. This great right is expressed in the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, and it reads as follows: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." This exact provision is found in the Constitution of our state
in section 19, article I.
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through many great judges
and in a great number of cases, has staunchly refused to allow this right to
be violated. In the highest court of our country, the protection extends even
further than the literal words of the Amendment. No evidence obtained in
violation thereof may be used against a defendant in the federal courts.
In California, due to an unfortunate line of decisions, evidence illegally
obtained is admissible in the courts. With these holdings I have always been
in disagreement."7 I have always taken the position that the decisions of the
Supreme Court of California have given aid and comfort to so-called officers
of the law who are so lacking in respect for the constitutional provisions here
involved that they ruthlessly violate them with impunity. To them the constitutional right of privacy does not exist, and they make an empty, hollow
mockery out of the oath which they took to support the Constitution.
Under the law of this state any police officer may break into any home,
seize anything he may desire and this may be used against a defendant
despite the fact that no warrant had been issued, and that the breaking and
entering may have been done on mere suspicion or conjecture. These constitutional provisions were adopted to prevent this very evil.
It is indeed regrettable that the majority of the Supreme Court of California has seen fit to perpetuate a rule which permits peace officers to flout
these constitutional mandates. This rule was first pronounced by the Supreme
Court of California in Peoplev. Mayen,"s which was followed by the cases of
People v. Gonzales,'" and People v. Kelley."0 Abuses which have been practiced under this rule have been declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States to be of such gravity and so inhuman as to shock the conscience of
mankind and that "this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities."'" While the,
"See dissenting opinion in People v. Rochin, 101 CaLApp.2d 140, 143, 255 P.2d 913 (1950);

reversed by United States Supreme Court, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
'188 Cal. 237, 205 Pae. 435 (1922).
1920 Cal.2d 165, 124 P.2d 144 (1942).
2022 Cal.2d 169, 137 P.2d 1 (1943).
"Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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reversal of the Supreme Court of California by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Rochin case was not based upon the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States but upon the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to that Constitution, it cannot be denied
that had the courts of California followed the federal rule with respect to
excluding evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure,
the Rochin case would never have occurred.
It cannot be denied that it lies within the power of a majority of the
Supreme Court of California to change the rule which permitted and encouraged the shocking and inhuman conduct of peace officers depicted in the
Rochin case. The courts of last resort of many other states have seen fit to
adopt and follow the federal rule relating to the admissibility of evidence
obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure.
On December 6, 1950, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in the case of
Rickards v. State,22 overruled two prior decisions of that court and adopted
the federal rule with respect to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a
result of an unlawful search and seizure; that is, search without a search warrant. In the course of its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court of Delaware
stated:
"Courts following the Federal rule adopt the view that the efficient prosecution of criminals cannot justify a deliberate invasion of the right of the
citizen to be made secure against the violation of specific constitutional guarantees, and that the suggested remedy of a civil action is as a practical matter
no remedy at all. The Federal rule is a practical attempt to help preserve
the constitutional guarantees.
"We prefer the rule followed in the Federal courts. We conceive it the
duty of the courts to protect constitutional guarantees. The most effective
way to protect the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and
compulsory self-incrimination is to exclude from evidence any matter obtained by a violation of them.
"We believe that as long as the Constitution of this state contains the
guarantees to the citizen referred to, we have no choice but to use every
means at our disposal to preserve those guarantees. Since it is obvious that
the exclusion of such matters from evidence is the most practical protection,
we adopt that means. It is no answer to say that the rule hampers the task
of the prosecuting officer. If forced to choose between convenience to the
of constitutional guarantees to the citizens,
prosecutor and a deprivation
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we in fact have no choice."
While it is my privilege, it is not my pleasure to write dissenting opinions. I would much prefer to concur with the majority or have them concur
in opinions prepared by me. The preparation of a dissent requires extra
effort-it is an additional burden and one that I choose to avoid whenever
possible. But I believe it to be my solemn duty when the majority departs
245 Del. 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950).
131d. at 585, 77 A.2d at 205.
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from settled rules of law in rendering its decision, to call attention to the
error in a dissenting opinion in the hope that the error may be corrected by a
subsequent decision or by the Legislature. A dissenting opinion may also be
helpful in cases which are subject to review by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The latter court has held in accord with my dissent and reversed the Supreme Court of California in several cases in recent years.
I have mentioned only a few of the cases in which I have disagreed with
the majority since I have been a member of the Supreme Court of California.
My dissents cover a wide variety of subjects and speak for themselves. They
present my view on the propositions of law involved in each of the cases.
They are now recorded judicial history. I have no apology to offer for any
of them, notwithstanding the fact that certain isolated statements and phrases
have been selected from some of them and criticized as being intemperate by
some eminent authorities. I claim the privilege of using language appropriate
to the occasion to express my view and I am not disposed to permit even dean
emeritus Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School to tell me what language
I should use when depicting the gross'injustices which may result from a
majority decision of the Supreme Court of California. I might say right here
and now that I have failed to find language strong enough to give expression
to my views in some cases. The language used should be equal to the occasion. A decision which is only a mild departure from settled principles should
not be dealt with the same as one which outrages justice and lacks even a
semblance of reason or common sense to support it. When the inimitable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt depicted the sneak attack of the Japanese on Pearl
Harbor, he declared that that incident would "live in infamy," and when that
master of rhetoric and oratory, Sir Winston Churchill, referred to those
brigands, Hitler and Mussolini, who plunged the world into the worst holocaust of all time, he used the words "guttersnipe" and "jackal." But why
belabor the obvious? If the language used is inappropriate it reflects more on
the dissenter than on the majority and its value and effect will be appraised,
by both contemporary observers and posterity.
Of greater importance than the language used in either a majority or
dissenting opinion is the reasoning or philosophy upon which the opinion is
based-what rules of law are announced-on which side does justice lieor in other words, who is right? The answer to this question depends upon
one's point of view. I do not claim that I have always been right. I may have
been wrong many times, but I feel it is my duty to the people of California
to give them the benefit of my opinion on all major issues which come before
the Supreme Court. This I have attempted to do. I claim no credit-seek no
acclaim or recognition for what I have done or may do in the future-it is
my job as I see it, and as long as I have the physical and mental capacity,
I shall continue to perform that duty.

